

BEST COPY
Available

6/24/98

State Dept. review completed

State Dept. review completed

Approved For Release 2003/07/30 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000600060017-7

NSC BRIEFING

29 November 1955

IMPLICATIONS OF US-CHICOM GENEVA DEADLOCK

- I. US-Chinese talks at Geneva in deadlock since 10 Sept '55, when two negotiators, US Ambassador Johnson and ChiCom Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, announced agreement on repatriation of nationals.
 - A. ChiComs refuse to concede that 10 Sept agreement provides for quick release of Americans imprisoned for violation of Chinese laws.
 1. Of 19 Americans whose release ChiComs have delayed since 10 Sept, 5 have now been freed.
 2. ChiComs refuse to make any commitment with respect to remaining 14, say that cases would be reviewed one by one, and imply that release would be dependent on progress of Geneva talks.
 3. ChiComs have also rejected Ambassador Johnson's request for an accounting of about 450 US personnel missing during Korean war and believed to be, or have once been, in China.
 - B. ChiComs also adamant in turning down US draft of proposed agreement to renounce use of force.
 1. Peiping insists that "liberation" of Taiwan is internal, not international, matter.
 2. While saying that "peaceful liberation" will be tried, ChiComs hold that renunciation of force to "liberate" Taiwan would be surrender of Chinese sovereignty.

58
DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. DECLASSIFIED CLASS CHANGED TO: TS S 0990
NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUG 1970-2
REVIEWER: 

Approved For Release 2003/07/30 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000600060017-7

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

II. Meanwhile, US is resisting ChiCom demands that talks be raised to foreign ministers' level.

A. Following 10 Sept agreement, ChiComs proposed two issues for discussion--abolition of trade embargoes directed against China and convening of a higher-level conference.

B. Wang has not pushed embargo issue, but is making repeated references to necessity for a foreign ministers' conference.

1. In turning down US draft of "renunciation of force" agreement, ChiComs proposed a text which declares that US and China renounce force in relations with each other and agree to convene a foreign ministers' conference.

2. As example further pressure, Chou En-lai has told recent foreign visitors he would be willing to meet with Secretary Dulles.

III. Current Peiping strategy is apparently to enhance ChiCom international position by arranging high-level talks with US, thereby further undermine status of ChiNats.

A. Continuing ChiCom pressure for such talks is designed to demonstrate that Sino-American relations are marked by de facto US recognition of Peiping regime.

B. Chiang Kai-shek has expressed concern to Ambassador Rankin that Geneva talks have strengthened impression US was moving toward recognition of Peiping.

IV. This effect not confined to Formosa.

25X1

Geneva talks have been important factor in producing change in "ideological climate" Thailand.

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

A. Other factors in Thai uneasiness ^{include} change in general climate since Bandung, statements from Moscow and Peiping designed to reassure Bangkok.

25X1

B. Change not yet reflected in foreign policy,

25X1

D. Prime Minister Phibun, who makes Thai foreign policy, obviously remembers Western efforts to get him to take suicidal position in 1941, while offering no troops to back him up.

25X6A

1. Despite this, Phibun was quickly recognized by US when he seized power after war; he no doubt has observed that Washington's resentment of a Thai fait accompli is short-lived.

E. Another factor: Phibun, nearing end of career, probably disquieted by comparisons between himself, as wily politician, and U Nu and Nehru, as world statesmen.

1. Phibun going to Rangoon on 14 Dec: while he will miss Bulganin-Krushchev party, effects of that visit may set the tune for U Nu's talks with Phibun.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
-4-

2. Meanwhile, in Bangkok, tension is high with once-powerful police chief, General Phao, being pushed further aside;

25X1

25X1

V. Meanwhile, upcoming UN vote on membership for Outer Mongolia further serves Peiping strategy of destroying international status of ChiNats.

- A. ChiNats feel they must use veto to block admission of Outer Mongolia for fear this admission would open door to Communist China.
- B. Ambassador Lodge states over-all sentiment in General Assembly would be to oust ChiNats if they block progress of intricate "package deal."

VI. Growing ChiCom impatience over Geneva deadlock increasingly evident in recent weeks.

25X1

- A.
- B. ChiCom newsmen at Geneva told Western correspondents on 17 Nov that talks could not go on much longer.
- C. Peiping "People's Daily", organ of ChiCom party, stated on 19 Nov that talks "should not be prolonged indefinitely."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-5-

D. Wang Ping-nan's impatience led Ambassador Johnson to report on 23 Nov, "I am not confident continuation of talks can be assured beyond next meeting unless some new element is introduced."

E. ChiComs are issuing more bellicose statements on determination "liberate" Taiwan.

1. Peiping radio on 14 Nov declared that ChiCom navy was capable of attack "if the liberation of Taiwan must be achieved by war."
2. Vice Premier Chen Yi reportedly said on 24 Nov that many people in China are becoming impatient about Taiwan and that "we do not immediately have to resort to the force of arms, but we must always prepare ourselves for that."

VII. ChiComs could undertake new military action in Offshore Island area in hopes of prying Geneva talks off dead center.

A. Although ChiComs lack ability to make successful assault on Taiwan against defending US forces, at least 5 of 9 air bases under construction along South China coast are now considered ready for use by tactical aircraft and assaults on the Matsus, Quemoy always possible.

1. There is some evidence to suggest ChiComs may be preparing to move air units to some of these fields.

-6-

2.

ChiComs

are building a causeway to link Tateng Island, the Communist territory nearest Quemoy, to mainland.

25X1

3.

several thousand troops

(recently arrived in Amoy from Shanghai) will be garrisoned on Tateng after the causeway is completed (in next two months).

B. Meanwhile, ChiNat rotation of troops between Offshore Islands and Taiwan in next few months, involving concentration of supply ships and troops, will offer inviting target for Communist air and artillery attacks.